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Abstract: Aging populations have altered saving and investment patterns in many
developed and emerging market economies. The structural changes that have occurred
have important implications for financial stability and for the conduct of monetary
policy. As assets and borrowing shifted from banks to pension funds and other
institutional investors, the market-based systems that replaced bank-based systems
became more procyclical and more vulnerable to systemic risk. In addition, banks’
receding share of financial assets undermined their role in channeling monetary policy
initiatives and thus eroded central banks’ ability to counter excessive credit growth and
contraction, defuse asset bubbles and act as effective lenders-of-last-resort in crises. This
paper offers policy choices and proposals to address the adverse outcomes of these
structural and institutional developments that are likely to intensify under the ongoing
pressure of demographic change.
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Introduction
Analysts have become increasingly concerned about how anticipated demographic
changes will affect financial markets. There is general agreement that the share of world
population over 65 will rise as the current century progresses. Reasoning out of the life
cycle theory of saving, it is assumed that saving rates will tend to decline. One study
concludes that the expected pattern of dissaving could lead to balance of payments
problems in countries where there is a higher percentage of retirees than in others, and
that there will be a shift in the pattern of ownership of financial claims from OECD to
emerging market economies as the residents of OECD countries age more rapidly over
the next several decades (Davis 2006). Meanwhile, some consequences of demographic
changes are already evident – in particular, the increased presence of institutional
investors such as pension and mutual funds – and the purpose of this paper is to describe
how that development has altered the structure and functions of national and international
markets in ways that have important implications for financial stability and the conduct
of monetary policy.
The paper begins by describing the increased dominance of institutional investors
in OECD countries and their rapid growth in emerging economies. Part II discusses these
investors’ role in enhancing the volatility of capital flows and exacerbating the
procyclicality of the global financial system and the potential for systemic risk. The next
section argues that the shift from bank-dominated to market-based systems entails a loss
of monetary control that impedes central banks’ ability to conduct countercyclical
policies and has contributed to excessive credit expansion and asset bubbles. The final
section offers policy choices and recommendations to better accommodate the structural
and institutional changes already underway that are likely to intensify under the ongoing
pressures of ageing.
Part I: Institutional Investors and the Transformation of Financial Markets
The increased dominance of institutional investors in advanced economies and their rapid
rate of growth in many emerging economies are transforming the structure and functions
of national financial systems around the globe. In OECD countries, assets under
management by institutional investors 1 rose from $13.8 trillion to $46.8 trillion from
1990 to year-end 2003, and from 77.6 to 157.8 percent of the aggregate GDP of these
countries. All three of the major institutional groups (insurance companies, pension
funds and investment companies) – all of which are used by households as repositories
for retirement savings - experienced particularly strong growth in this period, but the rate
of growth of investment companies was exceptional. 2 (Table 1).

1

Institutional investors include insurance companies, pension funds, investment companies, hedge funds,
real estate investment trusts (REITS) and private equity and venture capital funds. Investment companies
include closed-end and managed investment companies, mutual funds and unit investment trusts.
2
Assets under management by investment companies in OECD countries climbed from $2.6 trillion to
$16.2 trillion from 1990 to 2003, rising from 14.8 to 49.0 percent of total OECD GDP.
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While the expansion of institutional investors as a group has been rapid in all
OECD countries, the investment channels selected by households in individual countries
reflect significant differences. In some of the major industrial countries – the U.S.,
France and Italy – investment companies have become the largest segment of the
institutional investor sector but they have only recently caught up with insurance
companies in Germany. In Japan and the U.K., however, insurance companies are the
dominant institutional sector with investment companies lagging behind. Pension funds
hold the largest share of institutional investor assets in the Netherlands and have the
second largest share in the U.S. and the U.K. (Table 2).
Rapid growth in assets under management by institutional investors has not been
confined to OECD countries. In the decade from 1992 to 2002, both pension funds and
investment companies made substantial gains in the financial sectors of emerging market
economies in Latin America and Eastern Europe as reforms were implemented to
complement or gradually replace pay-as-you-go social security systems with fully
funded, defined contribution systems. Propelled by expansion in Chile and Mexico,
assets of pension funds rose from 0.9 to 9.2 percent of the aggregate GDP of 10 Latin
American countries over this period 3 while those of five Eastern European countries
climbed from zero to 3.8 percent of their GDP. For four Asian countries, the gain was
from 11.2 to 21.5 percent of their total GDP. Two of those countries – Malaysia and
Singapore – have government-sponsored, fully funded defined contribution systems for
civilian workers that hold assets in excess of 50 percent of GDP. (Table 3).
Growth rates for mutual fund assets in emerging economies have been even more
rapid than for pension funds in recent years, rising from 13.2 to 18.0 percent of aggregate
GDP for nine Asian countries and from 8.6 to 16.0 percent for seven Latin American
countries in the period 1998 through 2004. The most dramatic expansion of this
investment channel occurred in eight of the emerging market economies in Europe where
the value of assets under management by mutual funds climbed from 0.4 to 6.1 percent of
their aggregate GDP over the six-year period. (Table 4).
As these data indicate, an ongoing, global shift in household savings from
depository institutions to institutional investment pools is well underway. The factors
that have induced this shift vary among countries but a common thread is the new
emphasis on private pension and retirement funding as government-funded pensions
come under pressure. 4 But there are other contributing factors as well: growing wealth,
tax incentives, opportunities to diversity holdings, increased liquidity and the
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From 1980 through year-end 2003, Chilean pension assets grew from negligible amounts to 60 percent of
GDP. Bolivian pension assets reached 30 percent of GDP in 2003 after the shift from a pay-as-you-go to a
fully funded, defined-contribution system in 1997 (Chan-Lau 2004).
4
Recent (2004) reforms to publicly funded systems in OECD countries include cutting benefits and
increasing individual contributions in Japan and raising the retirement age and allowing contributions to
complementary private pension funds in Italy. In its 2005 Annual Report, the Bank for International
Settlements noted that pension and health-related spending for the OECD countries was projected to rise on
average by nearly seven percent of GDP over the next four decades. In its view, “Further policy action will
thus become increasingly unavoidable” (p. 32).
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contributions to efficiency resulting from technological advances, financial liberalization
and product innovation (Davis 2003).
While an examination of all these factors in all the countries that have
experienced substantial changes in their financial markets is beyond the scope of this
paper, brief discussions of developments in the U.S. and in emerging market economies
may be helpful in indicating the ways in which these shifts have developed in advanced
and developing markets.
The Role of Pension Funds in Reshaping the U.S. Financial Sector
For centuries, banks were the dominant financial institutions in Western economies and
evidence of the erosion of their dominance only emerged in the post-WW II era. In the
U.S., the decline in depository institutions’ share of total financial sector assets began in
the 1950s and accelerated in the l980s and 1990s. By 2005, the combined share of banks,
savings institutions and credit unions was 24.8 percent of the total for all sectors – less
than half of what it had been in 1955 (57.8 percent). Over the same period, the assets of
pension funds and mutual funds rose from 14.0 percent to 36.8 percent of total financial
sector assets (Table 6). In the years from 1975 through 2005, households’ shifted the
majority of their holdings of financial assets from deposits into mutual fund shares and
pension fund reserves (Table 7).
The growth in pension fund assets was spurred by the funding requirements of the
Employee Retirement Investment Security Act (ERISA) of 1975 with a spectacular
increase in households’ pension fund reserves over the decade from 1975 to 1985 and
continued strong growth through the 1990s. (Table 7). It is now widely believed that
privately funded plans are needed as supplements to social security and that perception
has prompted an even more rapid growth in individual retirement accounts (IRAs) over
the last decade. In 1995, IRAs held fewer assets than either defined benefit or defined
contribution funds but, by 2005, an almost three-fold increase pushed the value of IRAs
higher than any other type of U.S. retirement plan (Table 8).
In addition to these private pension funds and retirement accounts, publicly
funded plans outside the social security system have also grown in size and importance.
Retirement funds for state and local government employees doubled from 1995 to 2005
and funds for federal government employees almost doubled over the same period. The
increasing importance of these public and private funds is due not only to their role as
repositories of benefits for current and future retirees, but also to their added weight and
influence as participants in financial markets. At year-end 2005, total assets of U.S.
private and public pension funds and individual retirement accounts had risen to $12.2
trillion – an amount comparable to the nation’s annual output and 26 percent of the $47
trillion U.S. financial market (Table 8).
Rapid growth in U.S. investment company assets is linked to that of pension
funds but began almost a decade later as mutual funds became the recipients of a rising
volume of retirement savings channeled into defined contribution plans. The remarkable
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expansion of these two institutional segments undercut banks’ dominance of financial
markets not only by reducing the flow of household savings into deposits but – as their
appetite for securities grew – providing an additional incentive for banks to securitize
assets rather than hold them in portfolio.5 Moreover, as their diversification requirements
expanded demand in capital markets, pension and mutual funds contributed to the equally
spectacular rise in the assets of the housing-related government sponsored enterprises
(GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and federally-related mortgage pools, as
well as the group of asset-backed securities issuers that include the finance affiliates of
automobile manufacturers, credit card issuers, private mortgage companies and other
non-bank lenders. (Table 6). As a result, the U.S. capital markets have become the
primary source for both business and consumer investment and borrowing.
Given these changes in the instruments and channels for saving and investment, it
is not surprising that the activities of institutions have changed as well. Asset
management has become the dominant function in U.S. financial markets and trading has
become the principal activity. Bank lending remains important, particularly for small
business borrowers without direct access to capital markets, but banks, too, compete in
capital markets by managing mutual funds and offering asset-management services
through their trust departments. And since passage of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, larger banks have expanded their securities, asset-management and insurance
operations through financial holding companies.
The largest banks have extended their activities beyond traditional lending in
other ways as well. Since the 1970s, these institutions have been the dominant foreign
exchange market-makers. More recently, they have developed a highly profitable niche
providing financial insurance as dealers in derivatives and sellers of contingent and
committed lines of credit to back securities issues. In short, supported by the special
relationship with the central bank and access to its lender-of-last-resort facilities that their
unique role in the payments system confers, banks have become financial insurers,
stretching their shrinking resources to cushion the effects of changes in interest and
exchange rates on the value of the uninsured assets of institutional investors.
Pension Funds and Investment Companies in Emerging Market Economies
The growth in privatized pension funds and investment companies in emerging market
economies was facilitated by the establishment of stock markets in a number of countries
in the 1980s and 1990s. The number of countries that had established markets rose from
31 in 1985 to 48 in 1994 and to 67 at year-end 1998. Propelled by the rise in listed
companies from 8,916 to 19,397, market capitalization had jumped from $171 billion to
$1,929 trillion by 1994 - rising from 3.8 to 14.6 percent of the aggregate market
capitalization of advanced economies, but falling back after the financial crises that
followed in the 1990s (International Finance Corporation 1996).

5

The primary incentive for the securitization of bank loans was the adoption of the BIS capital adequacy
standards in 1988.
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At the same time that stock markets were being created and expanded, mandatory
pension systems were established in many emerging market countries. Chile privatized
its pension system in 1981, but other countries only began the process of reforming
public funds in the 1990s. 6 Many have included a privatized component by adopting the
“three pillar” model advocated by the World Bank in its 1994 report on pension funds
world-wide. 7 In those emerging economies that have established funded systems, the rise
in assets under management by pension funds from 6.3 percent of their combined GDP in
1992 to 20.3 percent in 2002 is evidence that shifts of savings into these channels is
transforming their financial systems as rapidly and effectively as occurred earlier in
advanced economies (Table 3).
Meanwhile, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) assisted many emerging
economies in developing public and private domestic mutual funds or investment trusts,
either by investing in their domestic funds or advising their governments in establishing a
regulatory framework for the industry. But the main thrust of the IFC’s program in the
1990s was the establishment of international emerging market equity funds to channel
foreign capital into the domestic markets of developing countries and improve their
functioning (IFC 1996). The success of these efforts is reflected in the rapid growth in
emerging market countries’ mutual funds in the period from 1998 through 2004 that
resulted in an additional impetus for the shift in savings from banks to the capital markets
(Table 4).
Nevertheless, pension funds have grown more rapidly than securities markets in
Latin America and Eastern Europe and the strengthening that has occurred is reflected in
the increased depth and liquidity in their government bond markets (Chan-Lau 2004).
While the establishment of local currency-denominated yield curves has contributed to
the development of domestic corporate bond markets, low liquidity, underdeveloped
underwriting procedures and high transactions costs have impeded their growth. The
growth of equity markets in emerging economies also appears to have lagged the
expansion of institutional investors and, like the corporate bond markets, has inhibited
opportunities for diversification and encouraged capital outflows. As these investment
channels outpace the supply of local securities, the markets in many of these countries
have become increasingly susceptible to the development of asset price bubbles.
Investment inflows from institutional investors in OECD countries compound the
problem.

6

Reforms were enacted in Peru (1993), Argentina (1994), Colombia (1994), Uruguay (1995), Bolivia
(1997), Mexico (1997) and El Salvador (1998). In 1997, Hungary, Poland and Kazakhstan enacted
legislation mandating the creation of private pension plans (Srinivas and Yermo 1999).
7
This approach retains a government-funded first pillar to alleviate poverty in old age, establishes a second
pillar to manage workers’ mandatory contributions to provide retirement income, and advocates a third
pillar that encourages additional, voluntary contributions to savings for retirement. In several Latin
American countries, the second pillar is privatized as in the Chilean model. Other countries retain a
government role in collecting funds from employers but privatize their management. Others, like Malaysia,
require mandatory contributions to a funded system but retain centralized national control (Valdes-Prieto
1994)
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Part II: Institutional Investors and Financial Stability
The asset allocation decisions of these institutions
have important implications for capital flows and asset
prices across asset classes and national borders. Going
forward, the size and influence of these institutions can be
expected to grow, particularly as some of these institutions
are still in their infancy in many countries. Demographic
trends and pension reforms will likely reinforce the creation
of more and larger asset gatherers. Relatively small changes
in the portfolios of such institutions may increasingly affect
global financial markets. Unlike financial markets dominated
by banks, capital markets tend to transmit changes in risk
appetite, credit assessments, or perceived economic fundamentals
more broadly, much faster, and more directly (IMF 2005b, p. 67) 8
As the IMF notes, institutional investors are subject to the same credit risks as banks but
are more susceptible to market risks. And, because they tend to be large institutions, their
decisions “make markets” (ibid., p. 65). 9 Some of the ways these institutions add to or
undermine the stability of financial markets can be discussed in terms of their role in
increasing or diminishing the volatility of interest and exchange rates, capital flows and
asset prices; their contributions to the growing procyclicality of financial systems and in
augmenting systemic risk.
Volatility
With a few notable exceptions, interest and exchange rates in global financial markets
remained relatively stable after the downturn in 2001. Many attribute this to the growing
sophistication of derivatives markets – especially credit derivatives – that have helped
distribute risk to a wider group of investors. Others argue that hedge funds’ speculative
activity has reduced volatility by broadening and deepening market liquidity. In addition,
the continuation of relatively stable asset prices and interest rates is seen as the result of
conscious efforts by the U.S., European and Japanese central banks to communicate
prospective changes in policy rates and make changes small so as not to surprise highly
leveraged financial institutions.
But the decline in interest and exchange rate volatility appears to have contributed
to increasingly volatile capital flows in 2004 and 2005 that exacerbated global
imbalances. As was the case in the early 1990s, low interest rates in advanced economies
sparked a search for yield that drove cross-border flows to historically high levels in
those years. A substantial portion of the funding for these flows was borrowed in the
8

The IMF adds that this is “particularly relevant for small or narrow asset classes, such as emerging market
external bond markets, which total about $265 billion. This is no more than about 0.5 percent of the …$45
trillion assets under management of institutional investors in mature economies” (ibid., p. 67).
9
As discussed, even in emerging economies, pension funds are large relative to the size of financial
markets (Chan-Lau 2004).
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external or so-called “euro” banking and securities markets which have also contributed
to the growth of institutional investors. 10 These markets are primary sources for the
expanding leverage in the global financial system. They provide funding for the crossborder carry trade transactions that drive the expansion of financial leverage and, as
discussed below, tighten the linkages between sectors and markets that exacerbate the
potential for systemic risk. 11
Capital flows into the US. In 2004 and 2005 were exceptionally large ($1.44
trillion and $1.29 trillion respectively) – much larger than the amount needed to finance
the U.S. current account deficit (BEA 2004 and 2005) - were mostly investments of
private rather than official foreign investors 12 and put ongoing, downward pressure on
U.S. interest rates. The excess inflow was borrowed by U.S. residents ($855.5 billion in
2004; $491.7 billion in 2005) and reinvested abroad, primarily for direct investments.
Thus, driven by investors’ aggressive search for yield and the persistence of debtfinanced speculation, excess inflows into the U.S. were recycled back into the global
economy - and, in some cases, to the countries that had supplied them - in ways that
exacerbated existing payments imbalances. 13
The Procyclical Influence of Institutional Investors
In its 2002 Annual Report, the BIS called attention to “the inherent procyclicality of
market-based financial systems” (p.151). Markets supply more funds at lower cost in a
boom and ration access (and raise costs) in a downturn. Bank-dominated systems that are
10

. Since their inception in the early 1970s, both the market for cross-border bank loans and the
international bond and note market ($21.1 trillion and $14 trillion respectively at year-end 2005) have
primarily financed the largest banks, investment banks and hedge funds in advanced economies rather than
non-financial borrowers or borrowers and issuers in emerging economies. At year-end 2005, 63.9 percent
of total cross-border and foreign currency claims of BIS reporting banks were interbank claims and
holdings of securities issued by other financial institutions, while 75.2 percent of outstanding international
bonds and notes were issues of financial institutions. Loans to emerging economies have remained below 8
percent since their precipitous decline during the Asian financial crisis while international bonds and notes
issued by these countries peaked at 6.2 percent of outstandings at year-end 2005. On the other hand, the
new surge of foreign portfolio investment into emerging markets in the third quarter of 2005 was
characterized by the BIS as “massive” in terms of the relative size of their economies (BIS 2006).
11
Cross-border carry trades involve borrowing in a low-yielding currency and investing in assets
denominated in a higher yielding currency. Beginning in the mid-1990s, significant increases in carry trade
transactions have helped drive up activity in both credit and foreign exchange markets and have played a
major role in the depreciation of funding currencies and appreciation of investment currencies.
12
While large increases in international reserves by Japan and China had fueled over a quarter of the inflow
in 2004, foreign official investors accounted for only 17 percent of new foreign investment in the U.S. in
2005.
13
For example, the larger share of inflows accounted for by private investors was largely due to a pick-up
in yen lending by Japanese banks that countered the surge in foreign investment in Japanese equities and
the resulting upward pressure on the yen by fueling renewed carry trade activity as a substitute for central
bank intervention. Given the short-term interest rate differential between the yen and the dollar,
investments in dollars funded by borrowing in yen were profitable. But continued low long-term rates in
the U.S. ensured that more leveraged flows would be routed into emerging economies in the second half of
2005, including many of the countries that were acquiring and holding additional dollar-denominated
reserves in the U.S. Thus, a substantial portion of their current account “savings” were recycled back to
these countries in the form of foreign ownership of their real and financial assets.
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subject to central banks’ quantitative monetary tools such as reserve and liquidity
requirements have, in the past, been able to serve as the conduits for countercyclical
policy aimed at moderating the spikes and troughs inherent in market-based systems by
supplying credit generated by the central bank in a downturn and rationing credit in a
boom as they respond to the costs imposed by the monetary authority. This aspect of
procyclicality – the erosion of monetary control – is discussed below. But there are other
ways in which systems dominated by institutional investors contribute to procyclicality.
In the most recent downturn, for example, constraints on investment and
employment were prolonged as large corporations struggled to cover short-falls in their
defined benefit pension plans. 14 In the U.S., these plans had been net sellers of assets
after 1994 when stock prices were rising, relying on appreciation to cover their growing
liabilities, and did not resume net purchases until 2003. All other U.S. pension plans
remained net purchasers of assets in the same period, with the largest net acquisitions by
IRAs. As stock prices fell, all plans suffered losses but defined benefit plans had the
largest losses and experienced the slowest recovery. 15
As pressure to meet funding requirements escalated, companies were forced to
divert income into pension investments rather than the ongoing operations of the firm. In
some cases, perceptions about the impact of funding obligations on balance sheets and
future growth depressed stock prices and led to downgrades in credit ratings that resulted
in higher costs of borrowing. Comparison of the losses of various types of plans suggests
that, because of their investment decisions, the corporate sponsors of defined benefit
plans not only exacerbated the procyclical impact of the downturn on their own net worth
but on that of their employees and beneficiaries as well.
Another characteristic of the shift to market-based systems is the procyclical
nature of the wealth effect on household balance sheets. While the face value of
households’ holdings of bank deposits remains constant over the business cycle, the value
of their credit market instruments and corporate equities – held directly or indirectly
through pension and mutual funds – fluctuates, rising during a boom and falling in a
downturn. Spending tends to increase as these assets appreciate and decline as they
depreciate in value. Thus, to the extent that increases in households’ marketable financial
assets augment the wealth effect, its influence in amplifying booms and downturns
grows.
14

The most visible examples were funds in the Netherlands and the defined benefit plans of automobile
manufacturers in the U.S. Their problems and the scale of problems in other countries resulted in actual and
proposed reforms in 2005 that prompted pension plans in the U.S., the Euro area and especially the
Netherlands to purchase long-dated assets to minimize shortfalls (BIS 2005b). The new U.S. law signed in
August 2006 will require pension plans to acquire fully funded status by 2011 and is expected to encourage
plans to move out of equities and into bonds (Scholtes 2006).
15
The value of U.S. defined benefit plans’ assets fell $530 billion between 1999 and 2002 – a drop of -25.5
percent. Defined contribution plans’ losses totaled -21.1 percent, those of state and local government
retirement plans fell -11.8 percent and IRA Accounts were down by -7.8 percent while the assets of federal
government retirement plans actually grew by 13.4 percent in this period. All plans had regained 1999
levels or were higher by year-end 2003 except defined benefit plans. Their value was only slightly higher
than in 1997 (Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds).
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For example, one way asset bubbles and their collapse caused damage in both
advanced and emerging market countries was through losses in pension fund and
retirement accounts invested in marketable securities. In the U.S., the bubble in stock
prices accounted for a phenomenal 71 percent rise in households’ net worth and an 86
percent increase in the value of pension fund reserves between 1994 and 1999,
constituting a “wealth effect” that contributed to rising consumption and declining
personal saving. After the market break, net worth fell 6.4 percent from year-end 1999 to
2002 but pension fund reserves fell 12.3 percent (Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds).
While the percentage losses were small relative to previous gains, the IMF reported that
the retreat in equity prices had produced a negative wealth effect equal to 70 percent of
households’ disposable income (IMF 2002).
The Federal Reserve’s efforts to counter these effects with ample provisions of
liquidity and low interest rates provided the conditions for households to refinance debt
and use appreciating equity in real estate to finance continued consumption. In addition
to pushing up the prices of homes, low interest rates contributed to a rebound in stock
prices in 2003 that raised net worth (12.2 percent) and pension fund reserves (16.0
percent) (Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds). But the policy response entailed a further
increase in household debt that many observers – including the BIS (2003) - believe will
worsen any eventual downturn. 16
These two examples of procyclical developments point to yet another important
consequence of the changes in channels for savings. As the IMF’s April 2005 Global
Financial Stability Report observed, increasing the exposure of individuals to direct
rather than indirect forms of risk has made the household sector the “shock absorber of
last resort” in the financial system (IMF 2005a, p.5)

Systemic Risk
The expansion of leverage points to another significant consequence of the change in
structure from bank-dominated to market-based systems and one that poses increased risk
for systemic stability. As they have experienced greater competition from institutional
investors, banks have accepted the greater risks involved in leveraged transactions and
off-balance-sheet commitments as a means to expand operations and profits and
minimize regulatory costs. While the shift to liability management began in the 1960s, it
was initially focused on purchased deposits. Over time, banks have come to rely more on
non-deposit liabilities for funding, intensifying their use of borrowed funds in the 1990s.
By year-end 2003, for example, funds borrowed under repurchase agreements (repos) and

16

As a share of GDP, household debt reached 84.3 percent in 2003 and climbed further to 92.1 percent at
year-end 2005 (Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds).
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in the federal funds (interbank) market were a larger share of U.S. banks’ liabilities than
checkable deposits. 17
As U.S. banks moved into a wider range of nonbanking activities after passage of
the Gramm/Leach/Bliley Act in 1999, their need for non-deposit liabilities grew.
Although nonbanks are not allowed to accept deposits, deposits are among the indirect
sources of funding for many similar nonbank operations among different financial
sectors 18 . Banks’ borrowing and lending in the repo, federal funds and euro markets
increases their interactions with other banks and institutional investors such as investment
banks, insurance companies and hedge funds. Repos and euro market borrowing are
primary sources of funding for proprietary trading and carry trade activity. As financial
institutions’ search for profits has taken them further away from traditional services to
nonfinancial customers and increased the scale of trading for their own accounts, the
growth in their borrowing as a share of total credit flows and in their claims on and
liabilities to other financial institutions has tightened the links between sectors and
increased the probability that problems in one group of institutions will spill over into
others. 19
The ready availability of funding for carry trades and proprietary trading has
driven up the amount of speculative activity in the global system. Both the BIS and the
IMF have argued that increased speculation has made the global financial sector more
vulnerable to shifts in economic activity or interest rates. The IMF believes that carry
trades clearly contribute to herding and magnify the risk of large movements in prices
and shrinking market liquidity if positions have to be reversed (IMF 2004). 20
Meanwhile, the risk to systemic stability posed by leveraged position-taking has
intensified with ongoing concentration in the global financial system. Ironically, the
greatest degree of concentration has occurred in the markets for credit derivatives and
17

Banks reported outstanding federal funds and security repurchase agreements of $1,069.2 billion
compared with checkable balances at all depository institutions of $998.5 billion (Federal Reserve, Flow of
Funds).
18
As The Economist observed: “Asset management, once so tribal, is becoming a giant melting-pot”
(November 18, 2006, p 75).
19
In the U.S., for example, borrowing by domestic financial institutions as a percentage of GDP was 3.7
percent in 1955. It rose to 29.8 percent of GDP in 1985, to 57.2 percent in 1995 and to 100.1 percent at
year-end 2005. By contrast, domestic nonfinancial borrowing – public and private – increased from 132.6
percent of GDP in 1955 to 211.4 percent at year-end 2005 (Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds). These data in
themselves provide evidence of how this major shift in institutional dominance has altered the structure of
the U.S. financial system.
20
These concerns were illustrated by events in 1998 associated with Russia’s default on its government
bonds and the collapse of the hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management. The flight to quality that
followed exerted sharp, downward pressure on interest rates for U.S. Treasury securities and forced the
unwinding of yen/dollar carry trades as returns on dollar holdings fell relative to the cost of yen borrowing.
The sale of dollar assets and the conversion of dollars into yen to repay borrowings drove up the value of
the yen by 7 percent on October 10 and an additional 10 percent by the end of the year. A more troubling
outcome was that the global over-the-counter derivatives markets seized up, eliminating the availability of
coverage for some investors at a time when it was most needed. The Federal Reserve’s intervention to
prevent sales of assets was, in the view of many, critical in preventing what might have been a free-fall in
asset prices and greater losses for both financial and nonfinancial investors.
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structured products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) – instruments that
were designed to disperse risk. For example, the BIS triennial survey in June 2004
revealed that 42 percent of the notional value of credit default swaps represented
contracts between reporting dealers (BIS 2005a). Given that a handful of banks in the
U.S. and other large advanced economies dominate these markets, the fact that this
limited number of dealers account for both sides of a substantial percentage of these
contracts means that liquidity in derivatives and their underlying markets would
drastically shrink if any one of these institutions was compelled to unwind its positions.
The BIS believes that credit derivatives have introduced beneficial changes in
global markets by expanding the investor base, providing more opportunities for
diversification and increasing the depth of trading (i.e., market liquidity). However, it
acknowledges that some market participants don’t fully understand the complexity of
these instruments and their hidden risks. Moreover, the fact that market participants tend
to use similar quantitative modes to assess value can lead to herding behavior that drains
liquidity. The BIS also notes that the growing use of credit derivatives heightens the
impact of market shifts on the balance sheets of highly leveraged institutions such as
hedge funds and, because of market integration and an expanded investor base, intensifies
the systemic role of these entities (BIS 2005a).
In short, the increased domination of institutional investors in advanced markets
has encouraged banks to compete by exploiting their presumed ability to draw on central
bank funding to expand their role as insurers of financial assets, to develop new nonbank
entities to engage in asset management and to enhance profitability by trading for their
own accounts. New sources of financing used for these activities, including structured
products and repurchase agreements, have widened the base for leverage within the
financial system and resulted in markets in which the scale of borrowing by financial
institutions rivals that of their nonfinancial customers. In addition to the growth in the
assets of institutional investors, increased interactions among financial sectors have also
made the current, bank-centered regulatory framework obsolete. As the IMF observed, “it
is now virtually impossible to conduct multilateral surveillance in financial markets at
large and not to understand the intricacies of nonbanks’ investment decisions and their
motivation” (IMF 2005b, p. 6).

Part III: The Erosion of Monetary Control and the Shrinking Scope for
Countercyclical Policy

Policymakers have long recognized the impact of these institutional changes on the
conduct of monetary policy. In 1993, for example, Alan Greenspan, then chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, noted that “the fairly direct effect that open market operations
once had on the credit flows provided for businesses and home construction is largely
dissipated” due to the diminished role of banks, the increase in savings channeled through
institutional investors and the growth of securitization. Though he asserted that “the
Federal Reserve can still affect short-term interest rates, and thus have an impact on the
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cost of borrowing from banks, from other intermediaries, and directly in the capital
markets”, he acknowledged that “this effect may be more indirect, take longer, and
require larger movements in rates for a given effect on output” (Greenspan 1993).
What Greenspan failed to acknowledge is that larger movements in interest rates
translate into greater volatility in money, asset and foreign exchange markets and
heighten risk by creating uncertainty about the availability and cost of funds. Thus, one
consequence of the erosion of monetary control has been an increased demand for
derivative products that offer financial insurance. Another is that the larger expansions
and contractions of liquidity needed to move rates contribute to the buildup in debt in an
upturn and intensify borrowers’ and lenders’ vulnerability as the economy slows.
But Greenspan’s 1993 and subsequent statements ignore another important
contribution to the loss of monetary control. At the same time that innovation and
restructuring were transforming the financial sector, pressure to deregulate led lawmakers
and regulators to dismantle the quantity controls that once constituted a key feature of
financial systems in both advanced and developing countries. 21 Historically, these
“macroprudential” policy tools have contributed to financial stability by restraining the
amount of credit extended by the banking system as a whole and promoting the
soundness of individual institutions. But limiting the amount of credit banks can extend
to customers restricts their opportunities for profit. During the 1970s and 1980s, offshore
banking activity grew explosively as depository institutions sought the higher returns
available in the unregulated Eurocurrency markets. Over time, cumulative shifts of
domestic investment and borrowing to the external markets gave central banks powerful
incentives to relax or remove quantity controls at home in efforts to repatriate banking
activity. A primary casualty of these central bank responses was the relaxation or
removal of reserve requirements by those monetary authorities that used this form of
quantity control.
In the U.S., for example, open market operations change the volume of bank
reserves and the impact of those changes on banks’ assets and liabilities constitute the
transmission belt for the implementation of monetary policy. The erosion of the
effectiveness of that channel accelerated in 1992 when reserve requirements on time
deposits were eliminated and those on demand deposits were reduced. 22 And, beginning
in the 1990s, banks increased their use of borrowed funds under repurchase agreements
and offered sweep accounts that shift demand balances into money market accounts –
strategies that significantly reduced the share of their liabilities subject to reserve
requirements.
While the erosion in the Federal Reserve’s leverage is also due to the decline in
banks’ share of U.S. financial assets, coverage by reserve balances dropped from 11
percent of the total deposits of all depository institutions in the 1950s to less than 0.4
21

Quantity controls include interest rate ceilings on deposits, liquidity and reserve requirements, direct
limits on credit expansion and international capital controls.
22
The purpose was to reduce the cost advantages of the Eurodollar market (where all deposits are time
deposits) and of foreign banks lending to U.S. residents from their home offices.
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percent in 2003 – an amount that underscores the dramatic narrowing of the bank channel
itself as a tool for policy implementation (Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds). 23 Using
open market operations to create or extinguish liquidity, the Federal Reserve can still
change the level of interest rates and thus influence the demand for credit. But relying on
changing demand without a symmetrical ability to change the credit supply means that, as
Greenspan noted, the central bank’s influence is indirect and it must inject or withdraw
larger amounts of liquidity to achieve a given effect on interest rates and economic
output.
Loss of Influence on the Credit Supply
Problems in U.S. markets generated by the Federal Reserve’s eroding influence over the
supply of credit became glaringly apparent in the 1980s and 1990s. The two major
problems - the rapid pace of credit expansion and the inability to sterilize or offset capital
flows – are, in fact, linked. In the seven-year period from 1983 to 1990, the debt of all
U.S. domestic nonfinancial sectors doubled from $5 trillion to $10 trillion, fueled by
large inflows of private foreign capital. During the recession at the beginning of the
1990s, capital outflows by U.S. investors in search of higher yields impeded the Federal
Reserve’s ability to stimulate the economy with low interest rates since the continuation
of lower rates encouraged more U.S. foreign portfolio investment abroad (primarily in
Mexico) and failed to attract offsetting foreign private inflows. With rising U.S. interest
rates in 1994, foreign private and official capital inflows resumed and provided between
10 and 30 percent of total lending in U.S. credit markets in every subsequent year
(Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds). 24
The effects of procyclical capital flows have not been limited to the U.S. and, as
in the U.S., those effects have been intensified by changes in financial structure.
Institutional investors now play a larger role in cross border flows and tend to purchase
financial assets in secondary markets rather than invest them in bank deposits, further
weakening central banks’ ability to sterilize inflows with existing bank-centered
monetary tools. As a result, credit has expanded dramatically in all countries that have
received substantial inflows of foreign portfolio investment. Foreign portfolio
investment is the primary channel for inflows into the U. S. and the scale of inflows has

23

While presiding over the demise of quantity controls, central bank members of the BIS recognized the
need to replace them with a prudential requirement acceptable to proponents of liberalization. Their choice
– the Basle Accord, adopted in 1988 – set capital adequacy standards for all multinational banks located in
the G-10 countries. It ensured that market forces – the providers (or withholders) of capital – would
determine the amount of loans banks could make. Adoption of the Basle capital standards – together with
banks’ growing reliance on purchased funds – reinforced the procyclical bias that the BIS more recently
noted is inherently present in a market-based system.
24
In the U.S., for example, the stock of foreign holdings of credit market instruments – primarily U.S.
government and agency securities and corporate bonds – rose dramatically (from $428.2 billion in 1985 to
$1,592.5 billion in 1995 and $5,604.6 billion at year-end 2005) as did foreign holdings of U.S. equities
(from $136.8 billion in 1985 to $549.5 billion in 1995 and $2,302.6 billion at year-end 2005) (Federal
Reserve, Flow of Funds).
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created a debt bubble that, as many analysts – including the BIS (2003) and IMF (2003) –
agree, threatens the future of U.S. economic growth. 25
Moreover, BIS economists argue that unchecked growth in credit fueled asset
booms in many countries in the 1990s (Borio and Lowe 2002) 26 and, in its 2005 Annual
Report, the BIS urged central banks to “use monetary and credit data as a basis for
resisting financial excesses in general, rather than inflationary pressures in particular” (p.
148). As this admonition suggests, the BIS believes central banks can no longer ignore
the explosion in global debt. It proposes the reintroduction of quantitative measures as
countercyclical strategies in implementing both regulatory and monetary policies and that
central banks set prudential norms relating to the growth in credit or asset prices. 27
Part IV: Accommodating Structural and Institutional Change: Policy Choices and
Recommendations
The proposed BIS macroprudential stabilization framework is a welcome and sensible
response to the pervasive instability in financial markets caused by credit booms and the
asset bubbles they engender. It is an ambitious agenda that would give monetary
authorities important tools to address unchecked credit growth and it presents a
significant challenge to the deregulatory and inflation-targeting practices of the last two
decades.
But the fact that these measures would apply only to banks and not to other
financial sectors weakens their ability to reestablish meaningful control over credit
expansion. Moreover, they do not address the issue of the eroding effectiveness of
explicit monetary tools such as reserve requirements and direct limits on bank credit
expansion. Thus they ignore the sclerotic condition of the channel for monetary policy
implementation. Another, critical omission is that they address the issue of financial
leverage indirectly, through collateral requirements. The measures proposed deal mainly
with credit standards governing loans to non-financial borrowers, not banks’ financial
counterparts. Because the most rapid growth in the financial sector is occurring outside
the banking industry, primarily among institutional investors, and because excessive
financial leveraging has become a problem that contributes to the erosion of monetary
control while enhancing systemic risk, a new policy framework must take account of
these developments in order to be effective.
One place to begin is by authorizing central banks to impose reserve requirements
on all leveraged transactions between financial institutions, regardless of the type of

25

As noted above, the debt of U.S. domestic nonfinancial sectors rose from 168.9 percent of GDP to 184.6
percent in 1995 and 211.4 percent at year-end 2005, a 42.5 percent increase over the two decades. For an
expanded discussion of this issue, see D’Arista and Griffith-Jones, 2006.
26
This BIS working paper argued that central banks have erred in targeting inflation; that low and stable
inflation actually increases the likelihood that excess demand pressures show up first in credit aggregates
and asset prices, rather than in goods and services prices.
27
The quantitative measures proposed by the BIS include liquidity requirements, loan-to-value ratios,
collateral requirements, margin requirements and tighter repayment periods.
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institution that undertakes them. 28 Creating these requirements would enlarge the pool of
risk-free deposits held in central bank accounts that financial institutions could buy or sell
to smooth liquidity imbalances at both the institutional and systemic level. Moreover, the
power to create and extinguish such reserves would significantly improve central banks’
ability to moderate financial excesses and strengthen countercyclical initiatives. In
addition, this new link between the central bank and all financial institutions would begin
the process of constructing the necessary platform for conducting the multilateral
surveillance that the IMF advocates. The more important objective, however, is to
reestablish effective countercyclical techniques for both regulatory and monetary
policies, and to do that, the channel for transmitting monetary initiatives must be widened
to include all financial sectors, not just banks.
Rebuilding Effective Countercyclical Strategies for Implementing Monetary Policy
Although the once-powerful role of reserve requirements has atrophied, they remain a
promising tool for reviving effective monetary control. But a reserve management
system that could adapt to current and future institutional changes requires several key
operational features: it must extend monetary control to all sectors of the financial
system (including pension and retirement funds); apply reserve requirements to financial
firms’ assets, expand central banks’ eligible holdings by using repurchase agreements
with the financial sector as the primary tool of open market operations, and use these
transactions to create and extinguish reserves.
Under an asset-based reserve system, the central bank would be authorized to
engage in repurchase agreements to buy or sell any asset held by financial institutions –
bank loans, mortgages, stocks, bonds and other securities, etc. 29 The central bank’s
repurchase agreement would be held on the liability side of its balance sheet and would
be matched on its asset side by the reserves it creates in payment for the assets it buys.
The balance sheets of financial institutions would show a reverse placement: they would
hold non-interest-bearing reserves on the liability side of their balance sheets and noninterest-bearing repurchase agreements with the central bank as assets. 30
The distribution of reserves in the form of non-interest-bearing liabilities will spur
the financial sector to acquire earning assets even in a downturn. Additions of these costfree liabilities might also encourage cancellations of non-performing loans and debt
securities by providing incentives for the financial sector to replace them with earning
assets. This would channel liquidity directly to households and businesses, helping avoid
the stagnation that develops when financial institutions are unwilling to make new loans

28

One precedent for imposing reserve requirements across all financial sectors is Sweden’s post-WWII
system for allocating credit to housing (U.S. House of Representatives 1972).
29
For a more comprehensive discussion of balance sheet structures and the conduct of policy initiatives
under an asset-based reserve system, see D’Arista 2002.
30
Under current reserve requirement systems, banks’ reserves are held on the asset side of their balance
sheets and enable them to create deposits by lending. Other financial sectors do not create liabilities by
lending. Thus the reverse placement is more appropriate for a monetary system that includes all sectors in
its transmission mechanism.
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and investments and cannot cancel debts for troubled borrowers without jeopardizing
their own survival.
When a central bank wishes to tighten monetary conditions, its ability to
extinguish reserves held on the liability side of financial institutions’ balance sheets
forces them to sell assets and adjust total asset holdings to the amounts that meet the
requirements for coverage by a lower level of reserve liabilities. And reserve
requirements that are assessed against assets cannot be evaded at the systemic level since
the central bank would control the volume of total reserves in the system. Institutions
could borrow or lend reserves to other institutions but could not substitute other forms of
borrowing for reserves. Thus the central bank would have effective control over changes
in the supply of credit
At the end of the day, the main purpose of reinstating control over the supply of
credit is to improve macroeconomic performance. Restoring the central bank’s ability to
moderate excessive changes in lending and investment would ensure a greater balance in
the distribution of financial resources across the business cycle. Creating an asset-based
reserve system would also provide a more direct and effective channel for influencing
asset prices and could replace or supplement controls on capital flows to mitigate their
expansionary or contractionary impacts.
Finally, a new reserve system is needed to enlarge the scope and effectiveness of
crisis management. Requiring the financial sector to hold reserves against assets would
accomplish that objective by directly linking all institutions and assets to the central
bank’s powers of liquidity creation. Should runs develop, all financial institutions would
be able to avoid selling assets (and thus driving down prices) by engaging in repurchase
agreements with the central bank and acquiring liabilities (reserves) to offset customers’
withdrawals. Making the liquidity cushion directly available to the system as a whole
would enhance stability and better accommodate the need to safeguard the expanding
volume of household savings now held in or managed by institutional investors.
Moderating the Volatility in International Capital Flows
While an asset-based reserve system will enhance the ability of central banks to
sterilize capital inflows and compensate for outflows, there is need for additional
attention to the ways in which these flows affect emerging market economies. As
discussed, the growth in the size and capitalization of markets in many of these countries
has not even kept pace with growth in the domestic institutional investor sector. Thus,
inflows of foreign portfolio investment tend to exacerbate volatility in secondary markets
rather than provide long-term financing for economic expansion, while outflows often
trigger or intensify currency crises. Moreover, many developing countries that need longterm financing for infrastructure and other basic components of development strategies
do not have markets that can absorb foreign portfolio investment flows not the credit
standing to attract them. As the World Bank’s previous efforts to expand and support
capital markets in these countries suggests, continued public support will be needed as
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emerging markets meet the needs and challenges of expanding institutional investment
sectors within their own financial systems.
Meanwhile, what is needed is a new channel for foreign portfolio investment to
provide flows that are stable, in amounts appropriate to the size of a country’s economy
and directed toward the goals of development rather than solely toward the short-term
profits of investors. Such a channel could be constructed by creating one or more closedend funds for emerging market investment under the Bretton Woods umbrella. 31 These
funds would issue their own liabilities to private and official investors and use the
proceeds to buy stocks and bonds of private enterprises and public agencies in a wide
spectrum of developing countries. While marketed primarily to institutional investors in
advanced economies, these liabilities would also qualify as international reserves,
guaranteed by a multinational agency and its member countries. Their purchase by the
central banks of developing countries would redirect external savings back into the
economies of the countries that own them rather than into the financial markets of strong
currency countries and help unwind the imbalances in the global economy that have been
exacerbated by the procyclicality and volatility of capital flows.
The inauguration of international closed-in funds would reduce the need for
capital controls if countries chose to accept foreign portfolio investment only through this
channel. Equally important, they would support the development of securities markets
denominated in local currencies in poor and middle-income countries and thus
accommodate the growth of institutional investors in these countries. As many analysts
have advocated (Davis 2001), this would assist pension funds in both advanced and
emerging economies in diversifying their portfolios internationally but would be of
particular benefit to those in developing countries both within their own markets and
externally. Their purchases of shares in these multinational closed-end funds would
encourage investment flows among developing countries by reducing the hazards of
country risk and lowering information and transactions costs. In these and other ways,
the creation of these funds would make a significant contribution to stabilizing capital
flows and help to ensure that the inevitable further expansion of institutional investors
sectors in advanced and emerging economies will assist in promoting economic growth
and development.
Rationalizing Financial Guaranties
31

Unlike open-end mutual funds that must buy back an unlimited number of shares in response to
investors’ demand, closed-end investment pools issue a finite number of shares that trade on stock
exchanges or in over-the-counter markets and are only redeemed at the initiative of the fund itself. This
structure would allow the prices of shares to fluctuate without triggering destabilizing purchases and sales
of the underlying investments. The structure could be made more suitable for long-term investors such as
pension funds by requiring that 10 to 20 percent of the value of shares sold to investors be used to purchase
and hold government securities of major industrial countries in amounts roughly proportional to the
holdings of the funds’ shares by residents of those countries. This would give investors a partial
guaranteed return, denominated in their own currencies, and capital backing in addition to the guarantee of
the multilateral agency and its member countries. Moreover, the introduction of these securities would
benefit both private and official investors by adding more low-risk instruments with long maturities to the
menu of assets in international financial markets.
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The proliferation of products such as derivatives that provide financial insurance for
institutions suggests that the financial sector itself believes that changes in financial
structure require new methods of protection. Although deposit insurance schemes are
still in place in many countries, the shift in personal savings from banks to pension and
retirement funds has eroded the protection they once gave households. As the IMF noted,
households have become the shock absorbers in financial markets. Clearly, a new means
for protecting households must be considered since losses in the value of funded pension
plans have – and will continue to have – important implications for changes in aggregate
demand and economic growth.
One way to provide more effective coverage for personal savings would be to
replace existing financial guaranty programs with a system that protects individuals
rather than institutions. Personal accounts in one or more financial institutions would be
covered up to a certain amount and premiums would be paid to the government insurance
agency out of the earnings on their covered assets.32 Premiums would be invested in
government securities and the system would be compulsory to ensure that all savers are
covered, that reserves are adequate, and that liability for losses is fairly distributed.
This basic framework could be elaborated or modified in a number of respects.
For example, it could better reflect the needs of savers by increasing the amount of
coverage for accounts held in more than one name or for heads of households on the basis
of the number of dependents. Small savers could be given additional advantages such as
a waiver of premium payments on aggregate accounts under a given amount or a sliding
scale for premiums based on gross income. To emphasize the protection of pension and
retirement funds, the ceiling for coverage of assets held in such plans could be raised for
individuals as they approach retirement age.
While some might object that moral hazard is inherent in any financial guaranty
scheme (Davis 2001), the proposal to insure individual savers is one that confronts the
moral hazard involved in insuring institutions because it can accommodate failure. For
example, if an institution does not take the necessary steps to improve the quality of
assets or address other problems and appears unlikely to do so, it will no longer be
permitted to advertise that the individual accounts it holds are insured and will be
required to notify customers that accounts held there will not be insured after a certain
date. While this will certainly create runs on individual institutions and result in failures,
savings will move to other institutions before losses occur. Thus a generalized loss of
confidence in the financial system will be avoided by an explicit assurance that
institutions that are permitted to accept insured accounts are considered sound.
Conclusion

32

Under the above proposal, individuals would pay a premium amounting to 10 percent of annual earnings
on assets (about 50 cents for every $5 dollars of earnings) until the fund reached the desired level.
Thereafter, a premium of one percent of earnings would probably be more than adequate in a system
covering all savers.
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Soundness was - and is - one of the primary concerns backing the various legislative
initiatives that require funding for pension plans. But focusing on the objective of
protecting beneficiaries through funding requirements alone has allowed new channels
for saving to emerge over the past three decades without attention to the ways in which
they have transformed financial structure and the bank-centered monetary and regulatory
frameworks that have traditionally governed national financial systems.
As discussed, institutional investors are outside the scope of countercyclical
monetary policies and have contributed to undermining the effectiveness of central bank
initiatives. As a result, their growing dominance has exacerbated the procyclicality of the
financial system and they have become a primary channel for transmitting that
procyclicality to the real economy - to corporations that sponsor defined benefit plans and
directly to households through the wealth effect. Moreover, their roles in augmenting the
volatility of capital flows and increasing the potential for systemic risk raise questions
about the ongoing stability of the global system and the links it has forged between
institutions and markets world-wide.
This paper has argued that a new macroprudential framework is needed to
accommodate the profound changes that have taken place in institutional functions and in
systemic structure. It notes that the BIS has already made proposals that can frame the
discussion of ways to approach the problem. But there is need for urgency. As one of
the most senior BIS spokesmen has said: “One hopes that it will not require a disorderly
unwinding of current excesses to prove convincingly that we have indeed been on a
dangerous path” (White 2006, p.16).
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Table 1 : Assets Under Management by Institutional Investors in OECD
Countries

Institutional
Investors
Insurance
companies
Pension funds
Investment
companies
Hedge funds
Others

Institutional
Investors
Insurance
companies
Pension funds
Investment
companies
Hedge funds
Others

1990

1995
in

2000
trillions

2001
of US

2002
Dollars

2003

2004

13.8

23.5

39.0

39.4

36.2

46.8

----

4.9
3.8

9.1
6.7

10.1
13.5

11.5
12.7

10.2
11.4

13.5
15.0

14.5
15.3

2.6
0.03
2.4

5.5
0.10
2.2

11.9
0.41
3.1

11.7
0.56
3.0

11.3
0.59
2.7

14.0
0.80
3.4

16.2
0.93
----

as percent

of GDP

77.6

97.8

152.1

155.3

136.4

157.2

----

27.8
21.2

37.8
27.8

39.4
52.6

45.3
50.1

38.4
42.9

45.4
50.4

44.0
46.4

14.8
0.1
13.6

22.7
0.4
9.1

46.3
1.6
12.4

45.9
2.2
11.7

42.7
2.2
10.1

47.2
2.7
11.5

49.0
2.8
----

Note: The data may reflect some double-counting of assets owned by defined
contribution pension funds and managed by investment companies. Investment
companies include closed-end and managed investment companies, mutual funds and
unit investment trusts. Other institutional investors include real estate investment trusts
(REITs) and private equity and venture capital funds. GDP is total for OECD countries.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report, September
2005, p. 67.
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Table 2: Assets of Institutional Investors of Major Industrial Countries
(in billions of U.S. dollars)
1990

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

United States
Insurance cos.
Pension funds
Investment cos.

1,884.9
2,427.3
1,154.6

2,803.9
4,196.9
2,731.5

3,997.7
6,479.3
6,454.9

4,084.5
5,881.4
6,598.7

4,264.8
5,036.6
6,115.0

4,832.9
5,994.2
7,025.6

5,310.0
6,545.3
7,787.8

Japan
Insurance cos.
Pension funds
Investment cos.

1,503.5
371.4
331.7

2,625.6
705.6
411.7

2,474.6
748.7
462.6

2,293.5
696.6
362.3

2,530.4
705.9
366.7

2,968.7
928.2
493.4

2,972.8
872.1
565.5

United Kingdom
Insurance cos.
Pension funds
Investment cos.

472.3
532.5
124.4

838.0
756.4
238.0

1,475.7
1,096.0
441.0

1,420.1
989.8
393.2

1,492.5
936.7
384.3

1,736.2
1,190.9
547.3

----1,464.0
492.7

Germany
Insurance cos.
Pension funds
Investment cos.

400.2
150.9
188.9

566.8
314.5
369.5

739.1
326.6
773.9

741.4
324.9
711.4

783.3
341.4
799.1

1,009.4
462.4
1,062.9

--------1,184.1

France
Insurance cos. and
pension funds
Investment cos.

---------

642.2
703.5

939.6
1,128.2

894.0
1,106.1

1,053.9
1,285.8

1,356.6
1,769.1

---------

Italy
Insurance cos.
Pension funds
Investment cos.

-------------

107.4
39.0
262.1

201.4
48.8
737.3

219.2
35.0
685.9

297.4
50.9
740.8

417.1
48.7
960.4

509.5
54.4
980.5

Netherlands
Insurance cos.
83.4
148.8
219.9
224.8
282.6
354.0
421.0
Pension funds
207.9
308.3
391.7
376.8
433.8
590.7
703.8
Investment cos.
32.1
53.8
87.0
72.8
71.5
95.0
105.1
Note: 1990 data for Germany refer to 1991. For some countries, the data may reflect some double-counting
of assets owned by defined contribution pension funds and managed by investment companies. Investment
companies include closed-end and managed investment companies, mutual funds and unit investment
trusts.
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report, September 2005, p. 68.
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Table 3: Pension Funds in Selected Emerging Market Countries
Assets under Management
(in millions of US Dollars)
1992
1997
2002
Latin America
10,064 117,606 136,242
Brazil
--77,800 44,300
Chile
10,064 27,198 35,515
Mexico
--615 31,748
Europe
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland

---------

--623
-----

11,,662
--3,435
6,674

Asia
Malaysia
Singapore
Korea

65,348 108,342 110,847
23,822 45,991 54,419
31,631 53,648 56,429
9,895
8,703
---

Total

75,412 225,948 258,751
(as percent of GDP)
1992 1997 2002
Latin America 0.9
6.5
9.2
Brazil
--9.7
9.1
Chile
22.6 32.8 53.5
Mexico
2.6
5.0
---

Europe
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland

---------

--1.3
-----

3.8
--4.5
3.5

Asia
Malaysia
Singapore
Korea

11.2
40.3
63.4
3.2

14.9
45.9
56.2
3.3

21.5
57.3
64.9
---

Total
6.3 12.4 20.3
Total Latin America also includes Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay. Total Europe also
includes Bulgaria, and Kazakhstan. Total Asia also includes
Hong Kong SAR.
SOURCE: Chan-Lau, IMF Working Paper 04/181, September 2004
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Table 4: Assets Under Management of Mutual Funds
1998

2000

2002

2004

in billions of U.S.
dollars

United States
Japan
Europe
Emerging market
countries
Asia
Latin America
Europe

5,525.2
376.5
2,740.7

6,964.7
432.0
3,290.3

6,390.4
303.2
3,440.0

8,106.9
399.5
5,572.0

305.3
140.7
2.6

384.9
180.4
5.7

431.6
138.6
19.2

703.3
273.7
88.8

60.9
7.6
37.6

69.1
8.6
43.8

in percent of GDP

United States
Japan
Europe

63.2
9.5
30.5

70.9
9.1
39.5

Emerging market
countries
Asia
13.2
13.7
13.8
18.0
Latin America
8.6
11.2
9.6
16.0
Europe
0.4
1.0
2.1
6.1
Note: Asia includes China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Taiwan Province of China, Thailand and Pakistan. Latin America includes Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Emerging Europe includes the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic and
Turkey.
SOURCE: Investment Company Institute and International Monetary Fund,
Global Financial Stability Report, September 2005, p. 78.
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Table 5: Asset allocation of OECD Institutional Investors
(in percent)

T
Insurance
companies
a
Domestic equity
b
Domestic
bonds
l
Foreign
equity
e
Foreign bonds
Other
5
:
Pension funds
Domestic
equity
A
Domestic
bonds
s
Foreign
s
equity
e
Foreign
bonds
t
Other
A
Investment
companies
l
Domestic
equity
l
Domestic
bonds
o
Foreign equity
c
Foreign
bonds

1997

2003

21
50
3
5
21

20
49
5
9
17

44
33
11
3
9

37
27
11
6
19

39
38
9
3

37
38
10
5

Note: shares computed as market-weighted shares of Germany, France,
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. “Other” includes
cash, real estate, commercial loans and credits, financial derivatives,
short-term investments, investments in hedge funds, private equity,
commodities and miscellaneous assets.
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability
Report, September 2005, p. 69.
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Table 6: Shares of Total Financial Assets Held by U.S. Financial Sectors
(in billions of dollars and percent)

Total for all financial sectors
Depository institutions
Insurance companies
Pension funds
Mutual funds
Nonbank lenders
GSEs & federally related
mortgage pools
Issuers of asset-backed
securities
Security brokers & dealers
Others
Percentage of Total Financial
Sector Assets
Depository institutions
Insurance companies
Pension funds
Mutual funds
Nonbank lenders
GSEs & federally related
mortgage pools
Issuers of asset-backed
securities
Security brokers & dealers
Others

1955

1965

1975

1985

1995

2005

$450.3
259.9
96.2
51.7
11.3
19.6

$986.3
539.5
163.6
160.9
42.8
48.9

$2,436.4
1,374.6
287.7
459.9
55.7
106.5

$8,531.6
3,787.3
825.2
2,032.2
496.6
363.1

$20,434.6
5,812.3
1,867.0
5,204.5
2,730.5
705.3

$47,144.1
11,690.7
3,240.0
8,995.5
8,322.8
1,366.7

5.6

19.8

121.9

691.9

2,468.1

6,482.6

0.0
5.9
0.1

0.0
10.3
0.5

0.0
21.5
8.6

37.2
156.0
142.1

662.1
568.1
416.7

3,059.1
2,144.1
1,842.6

100.0
57.8
21.4
11.5
2.5
4.4

100.0
54.7
16.6
16.3
4.3
5.0

100.0
56.4
11.8
18.9
2,3
4.4

100.0
44.4
9.7
23.8
5.8
4.3

100.0
28.4
9.1
25.5
13.4
3.5

100.0
24.8
6.9
19.1
17.7
2.9

1.2

2.0

5.0

8.1

12.1

13.8

---1.3
----

---1.0
----

---0.8
0.4

0.4
1.8
1.7

3.2
2.8
2.0

6.5
4.5
3.9

Note: Percentages may not sum due to rounding.
Pension funds include insured pension assets but exclude individual retirement accounts
(IRAs). Nonbank lenders include finance companies and mortgage companies.
“Others” includes real estate investment trusts and funding corporations.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.
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Table 7: Selected Assets Held by U.S. Households and Non-Profit
Organizations
(in billions of dollars and percent)
1975

1985
1995
2005
Amount
(billions
of dollars)
Tangible Assets
2.186.8
6,531.1
11,247.9
25,558.2
Financial Assets
3,668.1
9,961.8
21.483.0
38,464.9
Deposits
908.2
2,505.9
3,336.5
5,887.6
Credit market instruments
318.0
981.2
2,285.0
2,733.4
Corporate equities
584.6
1.229.5
4,347.5
6,088.9
Mutual fund shares
38.7
213.8
1,343.7
4,207.5
Pension fund reserves
467.0
2,088.1
5,695.2
10.646.7
Other
1,351.5
2,943.2
4,475.2
8,900.7
Total
5,854.9
16,492.9
32,730.8
64,023.1
Percentage of Household
Assets
Tangible Assets
37.3
39.6
34.4
39.9
Financial Assets
62.7
60.4
65.6
60.1
Deposits
15.5
15.2
10.2
9.2
Credit market instruments
5.4
5.9
7.0
4.3
Corporate equities
10.0
7.5
13.3
9.5
Mutual fund shares
0.7
1.3
4.1
6.6
Pension fund reserves
8.0
12.7
17.4
16.6
Other
23.1
17.8
13.7
13.9
Note: “Other” includes equity in non-corporate businesses, security credit, life insurance
reserves and miscellaneous assets. Columns may not sum due to rounding.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.
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Table 8: Assets Held by U.S. Private and Public Pension Funds and in Individual
Retirement Accounts
(in billions of dollars)
1995
1997
Private Pension Funds 2,896.4 3,710.4
Defined benefit
1,466.1 1,763.5
Defined contribution 1,430.3 1,946.9
State & Local Gov’t
Employee Retirement
Funds
1,303.3 1,817.1
Federal Government
Retirement Funds
541.1
659.1
Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs)
1,288.0 1,728.0

1999
2001
4,591.4 4,043.1
2,074.6 1,810.2
2,516.8 2,232.9

2003
4,114.4
1,744.3
2,370.1

2005
4,785.2
1,916.5
2,868.7

2,325.8 2,206.6

2,344.0

2,691.5

859.7

958.5

1,074.5

2,651.0 2,619.0

2,991.0

3,667.0

774.0

Total
6,028.8 7,914.6 10,342.2 9,728.4 10,407.9 12,218.2
Note: Private defined contribution plans include 401(k) type plans.
IRAs include Keogh accounts and assets of the household sector not included in pension
fund reserves except for those at life insurance companies.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.
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